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ABSTRACT 
Psychogenic Nonepileptic Seizures (PNES) superficially resemble epileptic seizures but are thought 
to have a psychological rather than epileptic basis.  Patients with PNES vary widely in terms of 
background, personality profiles, comorbidities, response to treatment and outcomes. Previous 
accounts interpreting these seizures as the activation of dissociated material, a physical manifestation 
of emotional distress, hard-wired reflex responses, or learned behaviours cannot explain key features 
of the phenomenon. Drawing on a brief review of the literature on etiology, correlates and 
phenomenology of PNES, this paper integrates existing approaches and data within a novel 
explanatory framework that applies to all PNES patients with subjectively involuntary seizures. 
Following the Integrative Cognitive Model of medically unexplained symptoms, we suggest that the 
central feature of all PNES is the automatic activation of a mental representation of seizures (the 
฀“฀s฀e฀i฀z฀u฀r฀e s c a f f฀o฀l฀d฀”฀) in the context of a high level inhibitory processing dysfunction. This often arises 
in response to elevated autonomic arousal, and may disrupt the ฀i฀n฀d฀i฀v฀i฀d฀u฀a฀l฀‟฀s awareness of distressing 
material, but can become divorced from abnormal autonomic and emotional activity. This model 
accounts both for existing findings and the heterogeneity of patients with PNES, whilst leading to a 
number of novel hypotheses against which it can be evaluated. 
 
KEYWORDS 
Psychogenic non-epileptic seizures (PNES); Dissociation; Integrative Cognitive Model; 
representation; autonomic arousal; interoception  
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INTRODUCTION 
Psychogenic Nonepileptic Seizures (PNES) are episodic disturbances of normal functioning 
and reduced self-control associated with a range of motor, sensory, and mental manifestations that 
superficially resemble epileptic attacks, but which are not caused by epileptic activity in the brain. 
PNES are newly diagnosed in more than 5/100,000 per year (Duncan, Razvi, & Mulhern, 2011), and 
the prevalence of this diagnosis has been estimated to be as high as 33/100,000 (Benbadis, Allen, & 
Hauser, 2000). PNES most frequently manifest in early adulthood but may first present in children as 
young as five and in older adults (Reuber, Fernandez, Bauer, Helmstaedter, & Elger, 2002). About 
one in five patients first presenting to a seizure clinic is diagnosed with PNES (Angus-Leppan, 
2008).  
PNES is not a category conceived through psychopathological research or theory. The 
diagnostic entity ฀“PNES฀” has primarily developed because patients with these seizures present to 
medical settings that are also used by patients with epilepsy, and because experts charged with 
making diagnoses have tended to attribute these phenomena to ฀“฀p฀s฀y฀c฀h฀o฀l฀o฀g฀i฀c฀a฀l฀” causes without 
wanting to commit themselves to a particular mechanism or to identifying a specific psychiatric 
disorder. Indeed, in the current nosologies, patients with PNES fall into a number of different 
categories: most, but not all, fulfil the diagnostic criteria of Functional Neurological Symptom 
(Conversion) Disorder in DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, 2013); diagnoses of Somatic 
Symptom Disorder, Dissociative Disorder or Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder may also be 
appropriate. In the context of these categorical conceptualisations, PNES would not be considered 
the result of willed action. However, some PNES-like behaviours may be wilfully produced as 
manifestations of Factitious Disorder or Malingering (the latter not being a mental disorder). While 
we accept that there are currently no objective tests capable of establishing whether actions are 
volitional or non-volitional (and there may not be a clear categorical distinction between these two 
types of actions), our focus in this paper is on PNES that are experienced as involuntary events and 
can be conceptualised as such. 
In clinical reality, the diagnosis of PNES follows the exclusion of alternative, ฀“฀p฀h฀y฀s฀i฀c฀a฀l฀” 
explanations for a patient฀‟฀s seizuresi. The distinction of PNES from epilepsy or other 
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pathophysiological disorders is often an iterative process. In view of the paroxysmal nature of the 
disorder, initial diagnoses are usually based on the description of seizure manifestations by patients 
and observers. As time goes by, more detailed witness reports may become available, and observers 
may capture typical seizures on video. Unremarkable interictal tests (such as structural magnetic 
resonance imaging, MRI, of the brain; electroencephalography, EEG; electrocardiography, ECG) 
may make alternative explanations for the paroxysmal symptoms less likely. In those with 
sufficiently frequent seizures, events may be captured by simultaneous video-EEG recording and, on 
close examination, found to exhibit behavioural manifestations typical of PNES rather than epilepsy 
and an absence of ictal or postictal epileptic EEG changes (LaFrance, Baker, Duncan, Goldstein, & 
Reuber, 2013).  
Most recent accounts suggest that various factors can contribute to the onset and maintenance 
of PNES, with the precise contribution varying from individual to individual (e.g., Baslet, 2011; 
Bodde et al., 2009; Goldstein, Deale, Mitchell-O'Malley, Toone, & Mellers, 2004; Reuber, 2009). 
Some theorists (e.g., Baslet, 2011; Goldstein et al., 2004) make specific claims about the nature of 
PNES; others (e.g., Bodde et al., 2009; Reuber, 2009) speak generally about predisposing, 
precipitating and perpetuating factors without clearly specifying what they consider PNES to actually 
be. Often, the focus is more on why PNES have developed rather than how, that is, on etiology rather 
than mechanism. In contrast, the focus in this paper is on the latter.  
In the sections below we distinguish between four main candidate mechanisms for PNES, 
distilled from existing theories of these phenomena. We then consider the evidence for these 
mechanisms and the limitations of existing approaches in this area. We continue by presenting a 
novel model of PNES that seeks to address these limitations by incorporating existing accounts 
within an over-arching theoretical framework, which clarifies the necessary and sufficient 
components of PNES, and their relationship with other clinical phenomena. We conclude by 
exploring the empirical and clinical implications of this model. 
EXISTING MODELS OF PNES 
Model 1: PNES as the activation of dissociated material 
Models based on this idea (e.g., Bowman, 2006; Harden, 1997; Kuyk, Van Dyck, & 
Spinhoven, 1996; Nijenhuis, 2004) originate in Pierre ฀J฀a฀n฀e฀t฀‟s 19th century account of hysteria. The 
central premise is that PNES result from a breakdown in psychological integration, in which 
memories and/or mental functions are separated or ฀“฀d฀i฀s฀s฀o฀c฀i฀a฀t฀e฀d฀” from consciousness. This account 
suggests that PNES are sensorimotor flashbacks that arise when dissociated material pertaining to 
past traumatic events intrudes into awareness, typically in response to a trauma reminder. These are 
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misinterpreted as seizures because only fragments of the dissociated material are available to 
awareness and their links to traumatic events are not recognized. Alternatively, the individual may 
recognise the reliving component of the experience but be unwilling or unable to articulate it; here 
the misinterpretation may be on the part of observers who see only the external features of the event. 
By this view, PNES are no different to other post-traumatic reliving phenomena, such as those seen 
in post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).  
Model 2: PNES as hard-wired responses  
According to this account, PNES reflect the operation of pre-wired behavioural tendencies 
(e.g., Baslet, 2011; Kretschmer, 1944), such as an intrinsic stress response similar to other defensive 
reactions (e.g., freeze; startle; Nijenhuis, Vanderlinden & Spinhoven, 1998). This may arise as an 
acute response to threat and/or alteration in arousal and is thought to serve a basic biological 
function, such as protecting the organism, regulating arousal or facilitating recuperation. It may 
occur in response to traumatic events or as part of a post-traumatic reaction, but is more than a 
simple reliving phenomenon. One variant of this account (Goldstein & Mellers, 2006) suggests that 
PNES are altered states of consciousness akin to panic attacks, in which the subjective fear 
component is dissociated from awareness (so-called ฀„฀p฀a฀n฀i฀c without p฀a฀n฀i฀c฀‟฀)฀. Here PNES are assumed 
to result from acute arousal that triggers a dissociative state characterized by emotional numbing, 
depersonalization-derealization and other aspects of the attacks. The dissociation described in this 
account of PNES is different to that in other models, however, in that it implicates an acute state of 
detachment rather than the activation of compartmentalized material (Brown, In press).  
Model 3: PNES as a physical manifestation of emotional distress  
In this account, PNES are typically seen as defensive responses that serve the function of 
enabling the individual to express distress or solve personal problems without having to 
acknowledge their emotional origins. This account originates in the Freudian concept of conversion 
and later psychodynamic ideas about somatization (e.g., Breuer & Freud, 1893-1895). One variant 
suggests that the features of PNES are the physical components of emotional states that the 
individual is either unwilling to recognize (i.e., is avoiding) or misinterprets for some reason, perhaps 
because they lack the ability to identify and/or name their emotions (two separate aspects of the 
alexithymia construct; see e.g., Coffey, Berenbaum, & Kerns, 2003). 
Model 4: PNES as learned behaviours 
This approach (e.g., Moore & Baker, 1997; Sirven & Glosser, 1998) suggests that PNES are 
habitual behaviours that are maintained by operant conditioning (positive and negative reinforcement 
in the behavioural tradition), and/or because they confer some intrinsic or extrinsic benefit (primary 
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and secondary gain in the psychodynamic tradition). A central component of this approach is that 
PNES develop in the context of seizure models, such as family members with epilepsy, from whom 
the behaviour is learnt.  
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR CURRENT MODELS 
In this section we discuss the extent to which existing research on PNES supports or 
challenges each of the four models. A summary of the key arguments for and against each model is 
provided in Table 1. 
---INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE--- 
Trauma and adversity 
 Numerous studies have considered whether patients with PNES are characterized by a history 
of adversity, particularly physical, sexual and (to a lesser extent) psychological abuse or neglect in 
childhood. Comparatively few studies have investigated whether PNES are precipitated by adverse 
events. Most studies have found that rates of childhood trauma are higher in patients with PNES than 
controls with epilepsy (for reviews see Fiszman, Alves-Leon, Nunes, D'Andrea, & Figueira, 2004; 
Sharpe & Faye, 2006; Brown & Reuber, 2016). Prevalence rates are substantial (85-100%) in some 
studies but are much lower in others and vary hugely according to patient selection and the definition 
used. Putting to one side the extensive methodological problems with research on this topic (see e.g., 
Sharpe & Faye, 2006), it is clear that a sizeable proportion of patients with PNES do not report a 
history of potentially traumatizing events (Brown & Reuber, 2016). In addition, in most studies, only 
a minority of patients (~40%; Fiszman et al., 2004) meet diagnostic criteria for PTSD. Although this 
number is likely to be higher when the dissociative sub-type of PTSD is taken into consideration, it is 
hard to reconcile these findings with the notion that PNES are inherently post-traumatic phenomena. 
As such, Model 1 is unlikely to offer a complete account of PNES unless a broader definition of 
adversity is adopted as a potential source of mental fragmentation. Nevertheless, traumatic events 
seem to be clinically relevant in many cases of PNES, and several studies suggest that a history of 
trauma is more common in patients who develop PNES than patients who develop other functional 
neurological symptoms (e.g. Reuber, Howlett, Khan, & Grunewald, 2007; Stone, Sharpe, & Binzer, 
2004). A comprehensive account of PNES must be able to accommodate these findings, without 
relying on them to explain the phenomenon.  
Dissociative ฀“traits฀”  
Most research on dissociation in patients with PNES has used ฀“trait฀” measures such as the 
Dissociative Experience Scales (DES; Bernstein & Putnam, 1996), reflecting an assumption that the 
mental fragmentation thought to be responsible for PNES will render them vulnerable to dissociative 
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phenomena more generally. Across ten studies reviewed by Brown and Reuber (2016), DES scores 
were moderately higher (median ฀C฀o฀h฀e฀n฀‟s d = 0.66) in patients with PNES compared to controls with 
epilepsy. The median DES score for patients with PNES across these studies (21.5) is comparable to 
psychiatric patients more generally (van Ijzendoorn & Schuengel, 1996) and substantially lower than 
the average within PTSD populations (32.6; ibid). There was also considerable variability, with the 
mean DES score of the PNES group (15.0; n = 132) in the largest and most rigorous study being 
somewhat lower than average and not significantly different from patients with epilepsy (d = 0.19; 
Alper et al., 1997).  
Taken together, these findings cast doubt on the notion that a general tendency to experience 
dissociative phenomena is an inherent characteristic of patients with PNES. There is a question mark 
over whether measures such as the DES provide a meaningful test of dissociation theories of PNES, 
however. A high DES score might be regarded as evidence of mental fragmentation, for example, 
and therefore as support for Model 1. It might also indicate a tendency to experience mental 
detachment, however, which would be more consistent with panic without panic (i.e., Model 2). 
Conversely, low scores on the DES may simply indicate that fragmentation or detachment are 
relatively circumscribed and not part of a broader tendency to experience other symptoms of this 
sort. It may also be that dissociative traits in patients with PNES manifest more as a tendency to 
experience somatoform dissociation (i.e., ฀“฀m฀e฀d฀i฀c฀a฀l฀l฀y ฀u฀n฀e฀x p l฀a฀i฀n฀e฀d฀” or functional neurological 
symptoms), rather than the ฀“฀p฀s฀y฀c฀h฀o฀f฀o฀r฀m฀” dissociation measured by scales such as the DES (e.g., 
Nijenhuis, 2004; see below). Indeed, patients with PNES score consistently higher on the 
Somatoform Dissociation Questionnaire (SDQ-20; Nijenhuis, Spinhoven, Van Dyck & Van Der Hart, 
1996) than controls with epilepsy (Brown & Reuber, 2016).   
High suggestibility has also been identified as a predisposing trait for PNES by some 
adherents of Model 1 (e.g., Kuyk et al., 1996), in keeping with Janet฀‟s original model of dissociation. 
There is some evidence that groups with PNES are more suggestible than controls with epilepsy 
(e.g., Barry, Atzman, & Morrell, 2000; Kuyk, Spinhoven, & van Dyck, 1999), and, unlike in 
epilepsy, suggestion methods can elicit PNES in most patients (e.g., Benbadis, Johnson, et al., 2000; 
McGonigal, Oto, Russell, Greene, & Duncan, 2002; Slater, Brown, Jacobs, & Ramsay, 1995). 
However, not all studies have found elevated suggestibility in groups with PNES (Goldstein, Drew, 
Mellers, Mitchell-O'Malley, & Oakley, 2000; Litwin & Cardeña, 2000), and many PNES patients 
score in the low suggestible range (e.g., Kuyk et al., 1999). It therefore seems unlikely that high 
suggestibility is a necessary precondition for the development of PNES.  
Anxiety and dissociation during PNES 
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Comparatively few studies have considered whether dissociation is evident during PNES 
themselves. In one large study of ฀“ictal฀” PNES symptoms, relatively few patients claimed they were 
aware of unpleasant memories at the time of their attacks, suggesting that this is relatively infrequent 
(<25%; Reuber et al., 2011). To our knowledge, however, the question of whether ฀p฀a฀r฀t฀i฀c฀i฀p฀a฀n฀t฀s฀‟ 
attacks resemble aspects of events that they cannot recall (a stronger test of Model 1) remains 
unanswered. Perhaps the best evidence for mental fragmentation during PNES is an innovative, 
albeit small, study by Kuyk et al (1999), who found that memories of ictal events for which the 
patient had previously been amnesic could be retrieved through hypnotic suggestion. Another study 
demonstrated that patients with PNES gained increasing access to their ฀“ictal฀” experience (without 
hypnosis) during the course of an intensive psychotherapy programme (von Fabeck, 2010). This 
simply demonstrates that compartmentalization of memories, which is a key component of Model 1, 
may occur in some patients with PNES at the time of their attacks; however, it does not prove that 
the attacks themselves are the product of compartmentalized material being activated.  
There is better evidence for other dissociative phenomena arising during PNES. Arguably the 
best study in this area (Hendrickson et al., 2015) found that 61.4% of 223 patients with PNES 
reported recurrent symptoms of unreality, detachment and disconnection (i.e., depersonalization-
derealization) immediately before, during or after their attacks; only 28.9% of patients with epilepsy 
(n = 128) reported similar experiences (cf. Goldstein & Mellers, 2006; Reuber et al., 2011). Other 
studies have found that a substantial proportion of patients with PNES report symptoms of arousal at 
the time of their attacks (Galimberti et al., 2003; Goldstein & Mellers, 2006; Hendrickson, Popescu, 
Dixit, Ghearing, & Bagic, 2014) but that subjective anxiety is comparatively infrequent. Hendrickson 
et al (2014), for example, found that 82.6% of their participants with PNES reported four of more 
physical panic symptoms (compared to 34.6% of the group with epilepsy), while Hendrickson et al 
(2015) revealed that only 40% of the PNES group reported feeling anxious. Although fewer patients 
with epilepsy in these studies reported subjective anxiety (23%), this represents a much larger 
proportion of those who reported four or more physical panic symptoms than in the PNES group 
(66.5% vs. 48.4%). These data are particularly revealing in the context of studies indicating that 
there are two distinct clusters of patients with PNES, one of which reports high levels of 
psychopathology (including anxiety) compared to controls with epilepsy and the other which does 
not (Brown et al., 2013; Cragar, Berry, Schmitt, & Fakhoury, 2005; Reuber, Pukrop, Bauer, Derfuss, 
& Elger, 2004; Uliaszek, Prensky, & Baslet, 2012). Taken together, these findings suggest that many 
people with PNES experience elevated physical arousal but do not recognize or describe themselves 
as anxious (Goldstein & Mellers, 2006; Dimaro et al, 2014). This may explain why scores on explicit 
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measures of general anxiety (i.e., outside the attacks) are only moderately elevated in groups of 
patients with PNES, and only slightly higher than controls with epilepsy in 28 studies comparing the 
two (median d = 0.24; Brown & Reuber, 2016). It also provides some support for the panic without 
panic model of PNES, although it is unclear how that concept might apply in cases where subjective 
anxiety is reported.   
Somatization and emotional processing 
 Evidence concerning the apparent disparity between physical and subjective symptoms of 
anxiety could also be regarded as consistent with the idea that PNES are a physical manifestation of 
emotional distress (Model 3). The main evidence base pertaining to that model comes from studies 
comparing patients with PNES and those with epilepsy on questionnaires that purport to measure this 
tendency directly, such as the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI hysteria and 
hypochondriasis sub-scales; Hathaway & McKinley, 1940), the Personality Assessment Inventory 
(PAI conversion and somatization sub-scales; Morey, 1991) and the Symptom Checklist 90 (SCL-90 
somatization sub-scale; Derogatis, Lipman, Rickels et al., 1974). Over twenty such studies have been 
conducted, with PNES patients scoring substantially higher in all cases (MMPI studies: hysteria sub-
scale median d = 1.28; hypochondriasis sub-scale median d = 0.95; non-MMPI studies: median d = 
0.75; for details see Brown & Reuber, 2016). This difference seems to remain when anxiety, 
depression and trauma-exposure are controlled for (Reuber, House, Pukrop, Bauer, & Elger, 2003; 
Roberts et al., 2012) and is apparent across different sub-groups of PNES patients, despite substantial 
differences in psychopathology more generally (Brown et al., 2013; Cragar et al., 2005; Uliaszek et 
al., 2012). Other studies have found that non-seizure medically unexplained symptoms (MUS) are 
common in patients with PNES (e.g., Bowman & Markand, 1996; Dixit, Popescu, Bagic, Ghearing, 
& Hendrickson, 2013; Duncan et al., 2011; Elliott & Charyton, 2014; McKenzie, Oto, Graham, & 
Duncan, 2011), who also tend to rate their physical health and functioning as worse than people with 
epilepsy (Al Marzooqi, Baker, Reilly, & Salmon, 2004). A higher number of somatic symptoms 
reported by patients with PNES is also associated with a greater severity of the disorder (even when 
dissociation and other psychopathology are controlled for) and with poorer outcomes (Reuber et al, 
2003; Reuber, Pukrop, Bauer et al., 2003). 
 Taken together, these studies clearly indicate that a tendency to report physical symptoms and 
disability is comparatively common in patients with PNES. This, coupled with the findings 
concerning the relatively modest levels of explicit anxiety described above, could be taken as 
evidence that patients with PNES tend to focus on the physical rather than the emotional components 
of their distress. Scales such as the MMPI, PAI and SCL-90 only measure physical symptoms and 
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not the processes giving rise to them, however. As such, it is unclear whether these findings indicate 
an active avoidance of emotional material, which is a central component of the original conversion 
and somatization models, or something less motivated, such as a heightened awareness of normal 
bodily events. Evidence suggesting a link between PNES and problems filtering out irrelevant 
stimuli (Pouretemad, Thompson, & Fenwick, 1998; Almis, Cumurcu, Unal, Ozcan & Aytas, 2013) 
could be seen as more consistent with the latter interpretation. 
 Studies addressing how patients with PNES manage their emotions paint a mixed picture. 
Roughly a third of this group have pronounced difficulties recognising their emotional states (i.e., 
alexithymia; Kaplan et al., 2013; Myers, Matzner, Lancman, Perrine, & Lancman, 2013; Tojek, 
Lumley, Barkley, Mahr, & Thomas, 2000; Wolf et al., 2015; for a review see Brown & Reuber, 
2016). However, the rate of alexithymia in patients with PNES is largely comparable to that seen in 
patients with epilepsy and other medical outpatients (Tojek et al. 2000; Myers et al., 2013; Taylor, 
Bagby & Parker, 1997). Several studies have found higher levels of physically and/or emotionally 
avoidant behaviour in patients with PNES compared to healthy controls (Bakvis, Spinhoven, Zitman, 
& Roelofs, 2011; Cronje & Pretorius, 2013; Dimaro et al., 2014; Frances, Baker, & Appleton, 1999; 
Goldstein, Drew, Mellers, Mitchell-O'Malley, & Oakley, 2000) and epilepsy (Goldstein & Mellers, 
2006; Novakova, Howlett, Baker, & Reuber, 2015; cf. Frances et al., 1999). Similarly, Jawad et al 
(1995) found evidence of defensive denial in patients with PNES, as did Stone, Binzer and Sharpe 
(2004) who also identified a tendency to emphasize somatic rather than emotional causes for their 
difficulties. A tendency to suppress affect was identified by Novakova et al (2015) and Gul and 
Ahmad (2014), whereas problems with emotional regulation were found by Roberts et al (2012). In 
contrast, other studies have found no evidence for disproportionate denial (Kaplan et al., 2013; Testa 
& Brandt, 2010; Testa, Krauss, Lesser, & Brandt, 2012) or emotional suppression (Testa et al., 2012) 
in this group. As before, these variable findings probably reflect the heterogeneity of patients with 
PNES: Reuber et al (2004), Uliaszek et al (2012) and Brown et al (2013) all found emotion 
regulation problems in only a sub-set of patients with PNES, alongside elevated psychopathology 
more generally. Brown et al (2013) found that alexithymia was consistently elevated in this group 
but much less common in a separate cluster of PNES patients with less psychopathology.    
 On balance, these findings suggest that a significant proportion of patients might be 
considered emotionally avoidant, which could be seen as consistent with Model 3. The existence of a 
sub-group of patients with PNES who report multiple physical symptoms but otherwise deny 
significant psychopathology has also been interpreted as evidence that PNES are a physical 
manifestation of emotional distress (Reuber et al., 2004; Cragar et al., 2005; Uliaszek et al., 2012). It 
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is difficult, however, to reconcile that interpretation with evidence suggesting that the most 
emotionally dysregulated and alexithymic patients also have the highest levels of psychopathology 
and physical symptom scores. It is also unclear how it would explain the negative findings of those 
studies that failed to find evidence of denial and emotional suppression. Also problematic is the fact 
that a relationship between PNES and difficulties managing affect could be regarded as consistent 
with all of the models described above, and therefore says little about the precise mechanisms of 
these phenomena. Finally, it is uncertain whether the physical component of an emotional state could 
realistically explain the defining features of PNES (i.e., loss/alteration of consciousness; abnormal 
movements) without additional theoretical assumptions. The Freudian model does posit a mechanism 
(i.e., conversion) to explain these features, but how such a mechanism might operate remains 
unclear. 
Stereotyping of symptoms 
 The idea that PNES reflect a hard-wired behavioural tendency (Model 2) is consistent with 
evidence suggesting that attack semiology is relatively stereotypic both between and within 
individuals (Seneviratne, Reutens, & D'Souza, 2010) and the existence of various culture-specific 
syndromes that closely resemble PNES (Brown & Lewis-Fernández, 2011). Other studies have found 
that PNES are quite variable within patients (Reuber et al., 2011), however, and that there are 
cultural variations in the presentation of PNES-like phenomena (Brown & Lewis-Fernández, 2011). 
PNES have also been shown to be considerably less stereotyped than either epilepsy or syncope 
(Reuber, Chen, Jamnadas-Khoda et al., In press). The number of, and variability between, different 
semiological sub-types of PNES (six in Seneviratne et al., 2010), and the fact that one seizure type 
can merge into another in a single PNES, also do not map easily onto a single hard-wired response. 
At least some modification of Model 2 is therefore required if it is to be a complete account of 
PNES. 
Symptom learning  
A possible link between PNES and prior exposure to seizures is often cited as evidence that 
PNES are learnt behaviours (Model 4) modelled on events encountered elsewhere (e.g., Moore & 
Baker, 1997; Bodde et al., 2009). It is well established that patients with PNES are more likely to 
have epilepsy than the general population (Reuber et al., 2003), suggesting that some element of 
learning may be involved. Similarly, Bautista, Gonzales-Salazar and Ochoa (2008) found that 
patients with PNES were more likely than those with epilepsy to have encountered seizures in other 
people before the onset of their own attacks. Other studies have found that patients with PNES are 
disproportionately likely to have a history of mild head injury, often with brief loss of consciousness, 
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in the weeks or months prior to the onset of their attacks (e.g., Elliott & Charyton, 2014; LaFrance et 
al, 2013; Mokleby et al., 2002; see Brown & Reuber, 2016). Few studies have considered whether 
positive and negative reinforcement influence the development and maintenance of PNES, however. 
There is some evidence that patients with PNES are more likely to be claiming public benefits than 
patients with epilepsy (Binder, Salinsky, & Smith, 1994; Kristensen & Alving, 1992), although this 
is more likely to be attributable to psychiatric co-morbidity than the attacks themselves (Brown & 
Reuber, 2016).  
Summary  
This brief overview demonstrates that there is evidence for each of the four main models of 
PNES, although the same body of evidence suggests that none of the models in their current form 
can provide a universal account of the disorder. One of the key limitations of models in this area is 
that they rarely provide an explicit account of key aspects of the phenomenology and semiology of 
PNES, such as the perceived involuntariness and apparent loss of consciousness reported by many 
patients, or the unusual motor movements that are often exhibited.   
One likely reason for conflicting findings (or, in some cases, discordant interpretations of 
broadly concordant findings) is the clinical heterogeneity of PNES. Heterogeneous contributory 
mechanisms are not only observed between different individuals with PNES, but the factors 
contributing to PNES may also change over the course of the disorder. Thus, an initial tendency to 
exhibit dissociative responses to particular stimuli may be aggravated by symptom misinterpretation 
and turned into a chronic problem by positive and negative reinforcement. What is more, the 
mechanisms described thus far are not mutually exclusive, and could be active simultaneously in a 
single patient. Indeed, most theorists draw on more than one of these when attempting to explain 
PNES (see e.g., Baslet, 2011; Bodde et al., 2009; Reuber, 2009). Unfortunately, the boundaries and 
connections between these mechanisms are rarely defined. This makes it difficult to generate precise 
hypotheses about their role or relative contribution in PNES. Indeed, many authors use generic terms 
that obscure potentially important differences between underlying mechanisms. The term 
฀“dissociation฀”฀, for example, could refer to either mental fragmentation (i.e., Model 1) or an altered 
state of consciousness characterized by depersonalization (i.e., Model 2), with very different clinical 
and empirical implications in each case. Similarly, high scores on measures such as the SDQ-20 
could be seen as evidence for Model 1 if the scale is regarded as a measure of dissociative traits, or 
Model 3 if it is regarded as a more general measure of physical symptom reporting. Evidence 
indicating that a significant proportion of patients with PNES have experienced health-related trauma 
(Duncan & Oto, 2008) also suggests a potential bridge between Models 1 and 3. 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Running head: Towards an integrative theory of PNES 
 
 
13 
 
In the following sections, we attempt to address these shortcomings by integrating existing 
models of PNES within an over-arching framework, which describes in detail how these different 
mechanisms relate to each other and their relative contribution to the development and maintenance 
of PNES. In so doing, we explain existing findings concerning PNES whilst making a number of 
novel predictions for future study.  
TOWARDS AN INTEGRATIVE THEORY OF PNES 
Explanatory domain 
Within the literature, any paroxysmal event that resembles or is attributed to epilepsy, but 
which is apparently generated by ฀“psychologica฀l฀” rather than epileptic processes, may be regarded as 
a form of PNES. Although useful for the clinical practice of neurologists, such an approach is 
problematic in that it obscures important differences between potentially distinct phenomena. 
Evidence suggests that a proportion of patients with a diagnosis of PNES have anxiety disorders 
(e.g., panic) that could entirely explain their attacks (Alper, Devinsky, Perrine, Vazquez, & Luciano, 
1995). Similarly, there are patients with PTSD, Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID), 
Depersonalization Disorder, Factitious Disorder or challenging behaviour in the context of learning 
disability whose ฀“seizures฀” are essentially explained by those conditions, and who may not have 
attracted the PNES label had they had been assessed by a psychiatrist rather than a neurologist. In 
other cases, however, such diagnoses are insufficient to explain the existence and/or the presentation 
of the attacks and need to be regarded as comorbid rather than explanatory. Why these different 
phenomena all attract the same label is an interesting question, but this is arguably not what theories 
of PNES are intended to explain. Moreover, incorporating them all within a common explanatory 
framework makes it difficult to delineate precise psychological mechanisms and raises major 
problems when it comes to selecting homogeneous groups for research or developing effective 
treatment strategies.  
We suggest that the phenomenon of fundamental interest to researchers in the field of PNES 
is that variant of DSM-5 Conversion (Functional Neurological Symptom) Disorder characterized by 
behavioural and experiential paroxysms that resemble epileptic seizures but which cannot be fully 
accounted for by other psychiatric conditions like Panic Disorder, Depersonalization Disorder, 
PTSD, DID, Somatic Symptom Disorder etc. That is not to say that PNES cannot occur in the 
context of these conditions: indeed, they may be a central symptom of them or interact in other ways. 
The key point is that it should be possible to explain PNES without reference to these conditions, 
whilst also being able to accommodate their co-occurrence.   
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Having pinned down the population of interest, what phenomena must a theory of PNES 
explain? First, there is the initial onset of seizures, followed by their development into a problem that 
is maintained over time. Second, there are the characteristic features of the attacks themselves, 
particularly their seizure-like semiology (e.g., abnormal motor movements) and phenomenology 
(e.g., perceived involuntariness; alterations in awareness and responsivity), as well as the fact that 
these can be highly stereotyped and yet also vary significantly both between and within individuals 
over time. Third, an explanatory model needs to acknowledge that PNES are particularly dramatic 
moments of a disorder also characterized by abnormal functioning between seizures. Finally, it must 
explain the apparent similarities between different patients with PNES, as well as how they diverge. 
With regards to the latter, it is clear that patients with PNES vary significantly in their reports of 
seizure experiences and overt psychopathology, and that they may or may not report exposure to 
potentially traumatizing events.  
The Integrative Cognitive Model  
Arguably the most consistent finding in this area is that patients with PNES report more 
physical symptoms of all types than relevant controls, including patients with comparable trauma 
histories (Roberts et al., 2012); this seems to be true regardless of the overall level of 
psychopathology (Brown & Reuber, 2016). One way of interpreting this is that PNES are one 
manifestation of a broader tendency to experience and report ฀“฀m฀e฀d฀i฀c฀a฀l฀l฀y ฀u฀n฀e฀x p l฀a฀i฀n฀e฀d฀” physic l 
symptoms (MUS), all of which result from similar underlying processes. This idea is central to 
Model 3 described above. However, there do appear to be some differences between patients with 
PNES and other MUS. Guz et al (2003), for example, found that patients with PNES (n = 23) 
reported significantly more dissociation than conversion disorder patients with motor symptoms or 
deficits. Similarly, there is evidence that patients with PNES are more likely to report histories of 
abuse, childhood adversity and significant life stressors prior to the onset of their symptoms than 
patients with functional (i.e., medically unexplained) movement disorders (FMD; Stone et al. 2004; 
Driver-Dunckley, Stonnington, Locke, & Noe, 2011; Reuber, Howlett, Khan, & Grunewald, 2007).  
Conversely, a history of explicit anxiety was identified as more common in patients with FMD than 
PNES by Driver-Dunckley et al (2011). There are also differences in phenomenology: PNES are 
clearly episodic in nature, unlike some other MUS that are more continuous. Most patients with 
PNES report that their episodes involve impairment of consciousness. Even if PNES and other MUS 
have some mechanisms in common, it is clearly necessary to account for these differences as well.  
 Given the evident overlap between many features of PNES and other MUS, we believe that a 
comprehensive account of PNES must draw on, and be consistent with, theory concerning MUS in 
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general. Accordingly, the model we present here builds on the Integrative Cognitive Model (ICM) of 
MUS (Brown, 2002a, 2004, 2006, 2013a,b), which was developed as an over-arching account of 
functional symptoms. Although the ICM has been applied to PNES previously (e.g., Brown, 2013a), 
we go beyond the original account by elucidating the role of emotional processes in PNES, which 
have received only minimal attention in previous versions of the model. We also draw on the specific 
evidence base pertaining to PNES to identify potential differences between this phenomenon and 
other MUS, which have not been considered previously within the ICM.  
Consciousness, emotional processing and behaviour 
 A central principle within the ICM is that an understanding of ordinary consciousness and 
action control is necessary if we are to explain functional symptoms like PNES (Brown, 2004, 2006, 
2013a,b). The ICM adopts a constructivist approach to perception, assuming that the contents of 
awareness are an inference made about current inputs based on knowledge stored within the system. 
According to the model, inputs from the internal and external environment automatically trigger a 
parallel spread of activation within associative memory, simultaneously generating a number of 
possible hypotheses about the cause and nature of those inputs. The most active hypothesis is then 
combined with sensory data to produce a multi-modal representation that forms the contents of 
conscious awareness and provides the basis for further cognition and action. By this view, 
perception, cognition and action are partly determined by what is present in the world, partly by what 
the perceptual system predicts will be present given past experience and partly by inherent structural 
properties of the system (i.e., what it is capable of representing). 
In the original ICM, no reference was made to the role of emotional evaluation in the 
perceptual process. Here, we follow Barrett and Bar (2009) in assuming that the basic ฀„gist฀‟ of inputs 
to the system are captured shortly after stimulus registration, triggering autonomic and endocrine 
changes that recreate the internal milieu associated with similar stimuli in the past (see also Van der 
Bergh, Witthöft, Petersen & Brown, submitted). This allows the system to predict whether those 
stimuli are aversive, appetitive or neutral, and to motivate action (e.g., approach, avoid, communicate 
to others) accordingly. The tendency to categorize stimuli as threatening at this early stage of 
processing varies according to differences in state and trait anxiety (Hariri, 2009; Yiend, 2010; 
Robinson, Letkiewicz, Overstreet et al., 2011), and probably variations in arousal more generally. 
This process is largely unconscious, although the individual may become aware of non-specific 
intuitions or ฀“฀g฀u฀t ฀f฀e฀e฀l฀i฀n฀g฀s฀” in relation to the stimulus (e.g., threatening vs. rewarding; avoid vs. 
approach), as well as associated autonomic symptoms. The precise nature and meaning of the 
stimulus will only become apparent after further processing has taken place, however. This will 
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involve both pre-conscious (in the form of further spreading of activation within associative memory 
and other systems) and post-conscious processing (in the form of active reasoning about the meaning 
of inferences and feelings arising from the lower level).  
The ICM assumes that the outputs of perceptual and emotional inference automatically 
activate a hierarchical system of procedural representations (schemata) specifying the attentional, 
evaluative, cognitive, autonomic and motoric processes involved in executing well-learned actions. 
At the top of this hierarchy are high-level programs corresponding to general situations (e.g., 
฀“฀d฀r฀i฀v฀i฀n฀g a ฀c฀a฀r฀”, ฀“ g฀o฀i฀n฀g t  a r฀e฀s฀t฀a฀u฀r฀a฀n฀t฀”฀)฀. Within each of hese high-level programs are simpler 
representations corresponding to different acts within that situation (e.g., ฀“reversing฀”, ฀“฀o฀r฀d฀e฀r฀i฀n฀g 
฀f฀o฀o฀d฀”฀)฀; each of these representations has even simpler sub-programs describing the various elements 
of the act (e.g., ฀“฀c฀h฀a฀n฀g฀i฀n฀g ฀g฀e฀a฀r฀”, “ r e฀a฀d฀i฀n฀g the ฀m฀e฀n฀u฀”฀) a d so on. These programs are activated to 
varying degrees by perceptual output; when a threshold level of activation is reached, the program is 
triggered automatically and the associated behaviour (or cognitive process) runs until completion 
unless it is impeded or inhibited by other information in the system. This automatic execution of 
programs ฀(฀“฀c฀o฀n฀t฀e฀n฀t฀i฀o฀n ฀s฀c฀h฀e฀d฀u฀l฀i฀n฀g฀” in Norman & Shallice, 1986) provides the system with a means 
of controlling routine cognition and action that is rapid, highly efficient, and consumes relatively few 
processing resources. Behaviours controlled at this level are experienced as occurring without 
conscious effort, meaning that much complex behaviour is performed automatically and with 
minimal will or conscious representation. Functionally speaking, such acts are ฀“unwilled฀” but are 
typically experienced by the individual as ego-syntonic and voluntary (albeit effortless) due to their 
congruence with relevant information (e.g., goals; the context of the action) in the system (Brown & 
Oakley, 2004).  
An additional means of control is required in cases where the system lacks the appropriate 
representations to guide behaviour effectively. In the ICM, novel actions are controlled by a 
secondary attentional system (SAS), a high-level, executive system that controls action indirectly by 
biasing the relative activation levels of lower-level programs. Secondary attention is the site of self-
regulatory processing, whereby cognition and action are moderated in the pursuit of personal goals. 
In addition to increasing the activation of relevant programs, a key function of this system is to 
inhibit the activation of inappropriate programs. Behaviours controlled at this level are ฀“฀w฀i฀l฀l฀e฀d฀”฀; they 
are perceived as mentally demanding, and are associated with a sense of conscious volition and self-
awareness (Brown & Oakley, 2004). On a neural level, this system is sub-served by a complex 
network of structures with particular representation in frontal and prefrontal areas (Shallice & 
Cooper, 2011).  
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Functional symptoms and the activation of rogue representations 
A central tenet of the ICM is that numerous factors other than stimuli themselves influence 
the activation of hypotheses during the perceptual process, meaning that the most active hypothesis 
may not be the one with the closest relationship to actual events in the world. If the match is good, 
perceptual experience will be an accurate reflection of reality. If the match is poor, however, then 
experience will be distorted, influencing behaviour accordingly. As the processes by which 
knowledge shape perception are preconscious, however, the individual is unaware that their 
experience is a misrepresentation. Many perceptual illusions, magic tricks and phenomena like the 
placebo effect all capitalize upon this tendency to perceive what we expect as much as what is 
actually ฀“฀o฀u฀t ฀t฀h฀e฀r฀e฀”฀. The same applies to behavioural programs; here, too, the most active 
representation (and therefore the behavioural/cognitive routine enacted) may not have the closest 
match with the perceptual input, meaning that unwanted experiences can arise when automatically 
triggered behaviours (broadly speaking, ฀“habits฀”฀) conflict with the ฀i฀n฀d฀i฀v฀i฀d฀u฀a฀l฀‟฀s goals. Dialing an out-
of-date telephone number, hypnotic behaviours and inappropriate responses in the ฀c฀h฀i฀l฀d฀r฀e฀n฀‟฀s game 
Simon says are familiar non-clinical examples of behaviours that are executed ฀“on auto-pilot฀” in this 
way. Here the behaviours are experienced as occurring involuntarily (and are potentially ego-
dystonic) because they are either inconsistent with system goals or, in the case of hypnotic 
phenomena, because beliefs about the context suggest they should be experienced that way (Brown 
& Oakley, 2004). 
 The essence of the ICM is that functional symptoms arise when the activation levels of 
hypotheses or representations pertaining to physical illness increase to the point where the system 
regards them as the best explanation of, or response to, what is happening in that moment, regardless 
of how consistent they are with sensory inputs. As the individual has no introspective access to the 
inferences underlying perception, the resulting symptoms are experienced as ฀„real฀‟฀. Brown (2004) 
coined the term rogue representations to refer to hypotheses and programs that distort perception and 
action in this way.  
By this view, the type of symptom experienced depends on the nature of the rogue 
representation involved. If the representation specifies the presence of a nociceptive stimulus, for 
example, unexplained pain will result. If it is a cognitive routine inhibiting visual processing, the 
experience will be one of functional blindness. According to this account, the onset and maintenance 
of functional symptoms can be understood with reference to the factors that trigger the initial 
activation of a rogue representation and maintain that activation over time. In the original version of 
the model, anything that increased attention to the rogue representation was identified as particularly 
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important in this regard (Brown, 2002a, 2004, 2006). More recently, it has been suggested that high-
level attentional dysfunction also contributes to functional symptoms, by undermining the 
฀i฀n฀d฀i฀v฀i฀d฀u฀a฀l฀‟฀s ability to inhibit discrepant mental representations (Brown, 2013a, b; In press; Dimaro et 
al, 2014).  
The mechanisms of PNES  
In previous descriptions of the ICM, it was suggested that PNES are essentially the same as 
other functional symptoms, except that the underlying rogue representation is characterized by 
motoric (e.g., convulsive movements) and cognitive (e.g., loss of awareness) features that resemble 
an epileptic event (e.g., Brown, 2013a). By that view, all seizure types could be explained with 
reference to the rogue representation concept, including convulsive, syncope-like and panic-like 
attacks, as well as more complex seizures involving automatisms, hallucinations etc. Whilst we 
retain this basic notion here, it is apparent that there are certain features of PNES that are not easily 
accounted for by this concept. In particular, several of the studies described above suggest that many 
patients with PNES experience multiple autonomic symptoms around the time of their attacks, 
sometimes in the absence of subjective fear (i.e., ฀„฀p฀a฀n฀i฀c without p฀a฀n฀i฀c฀‟฀)฀. Similarly, both Reinsberger 
et al (2012) and Van der Kruijs, Vonck, Langereis et al (2016) found objective evidence for 
increased arousal before PNES followed by a significant reduction post-ictally (see also Ponnusamy, 
Marques, & Reuber, 2012). There is also evidence for ictal depersonalization and derealization in 
many patients. How might these findings be accommodated in the ICM? 
As in the original ICM, we suggest that the central component of PNES is a transient loss in 
behavioural/cognitive control arising from the automatic execution of a seizure representation in 
memory (the seizure scaffold; see below); unlike the original ICM, however, we suggest that this 
often occurs in the context of significant autonomic changes related to threat processing. More 
specifically, we suggest that there are three separate stages that are commonly (although not 
universally; see below) found in PNES (Figure 1). The first stage is characterized by an acute 
increase in sympathetic arousal associated with a range of autonomic symptoms, which may or may 
not be accompanied by a lack of subjective fear (cf. Model 2); we discuss why these changes are 
represented as physical rather than emotional experiences below. This compromises inhibitory 
processing (typically in the context of compromised high-level processing more generally), rendering 
the individual vulnerable to the automatic activation of rogue representations. This, coupled with the 
prediction (conscious or otherwise) that an attack is likely to occur, results in a runaway surge of 
activation in the seizure scaffold. This triggers the second stage, in which the cognitive-behavioural 
component of the scaffold is executed, resulting in the attack-proper (cf. Model 4). Although ego-
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dystonic, this experience interrupts the sympathetic response in the third stage of the process, 
triggering a reduction in arousal. There may also be a rebound increase in parasympathetic tone in 
the recovery phase (minutes to hours) following a PNES, which could help to explain common post-
ictal phenomena such as exhaustion, reduced alertness and cognitive capacity. 
The semiology and phenomenology of the attack is related to the content of the seizure 
scaffold, a dynamic mental representation that develops as experiences and information accumulate 
and interact with inherent behavioural response patterns, resulting in considerable individual 
differences. In some cases, the scaffold may consist mainly of material stored following previous 
exposure to seizures/seizure-like phenomena and related experiences (e.g., loss of consciousness). In 
others, inherent components (i.e., ฀„฀h฀a฀r฀d- w฀i฀r฀e฀d฀‟ behavioural patterns) are likely to be more relevant, 
such as actions and cognitive biases typically associated with emotions such as fear, anger and/or 
disgust (cf. Kretschmer, 1923; Baslet, 2011); this is consistent with the apparently universal 
existence of PNES-like phenomena across cultures (Brown & Lewis-Fernández, 2011; Martinez-
Taboas, 2005) and the stereotyping of symtoms often seen. Rather than being cognitively 
impenetrable reflexes, we assume that these are general action tendencies that can be modified by 
other information, beliefs and goals within the system, consistent with the apparent variability of 
PNES between and within cultures and individuals (cf. Baslet, 2011). 
--- INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE --- 
Verifying and characterizing a reduction in arousal during PNES, which we mainly posit on 
theoretical rather than empirical grounds, will be an important task for future research. Many of the 
symptoms associated with PNES certainly fit this profile as do the physiological data described by 
Reinsberger et al (2012) and Van der Kruijs et al (2016). From a theoretical perspective, such a 
reduction in arousal would contribute to the development of symptom chronicity via a process of 
negative reinforcement (cf. Model 4). In this respect, the model is consistent with a behavioural 
understanding of PNES, as well as the psychodynamic idea that PNES can serve a psychological 
function for some individuals. Whilst we believe that many PNES are characterised by an initial 
increase and subsequent decrease in sympathetic arousal, however, we only consider the execution of 
the seizure program (i.e., stage 2 above) to be an essential aspect of PNES, which may arise if there 
is sufficient activation of the seizure scaffold in the context of a high-level processing dysfunction 
(dashed area in Figure 1). Indeed, as the system comes to predict that potentially unpleasant arousal 
(and/or other distressing experiences, such as cognitive dissonance) can be averted by executing the 
seizure program, so conditioned stimuli may come to elicit attacks before any threat or arousal is 
experienced. This explains why symptoms of arousal are not a universal occurrence during PNES 
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(see e.g., Hendrickson et al., 2014; Brown & Reuber, 2016). We predict that such symptoms will be 
more common in the early stages of the condition, before the effects of conditioning are established 
and generalized.  
An interesting, but potentially fraught, question is the extent to which individuals might 
willfully submit to seizures in order to experience the resulting ฀“฀r฀e฀l฀i฀e฀f฀”, which was identified as a 
feature in several patients with PNES discussed by Stone and Carson (2013; also Reuber et al., 
2011). This concept potentially applies to our account, as the build-up of arousal/dissonance in the 
pre-ictal phase is likely to be disturbing to the individual, particularly where they perceive it as a 
physical experience that is out of their control (see below). As the individual learns that seizures 
bring about a degree of relief from this in the short term, so submitting to the (apparently) inevitable 
might come to be regarded as preferable to remaining distressed or ฀“฀f฀i฀g฀h฀t฀i฀n฀g a losing b฀a฀t฀t฀l฀e฀”฀. 
However, we do not believe that submitting in this way is a necessary component of the seizure 
experience; moreover, if it occurs, it does so some way into a process that includes both unwanted 
and uncontrolled elements. Thus, while there may be varying degrees to which processes perceived 
as voluntary contribute to the seizure experience, involuntary processes are always a feature of PNES 
in this account. 
In the sections below we expand on different aspects of this model, including how they fit 
with the evidence in this area and what they imply in terms of novel predictions for future study. 
Relationship with other clinical phenomena  
The emphasis on the automatic activation of mental representations enables the model to 
explain the perceived involuntariness of PNES, which reflects the fact that the process is unwilled 
and inconsistent with the ฀i฀n฀d฀i฀v฀i฀d฀u฀a฀l฀‟฀s goals. We suggest that this aspect of the process is common to 
other functional neurological symptoms (FNS), and that the main difference in symptom semiology 
and phenomenology pertains to the content of the underlying mental representations. However, we 
also suggest that the rapid, paroxysmal and often acutely frightening nature of PNES means that they 
are more likely to be accompanied (and triggered) by symptoms of hyper-arousal than other FNS 
(although increased arousal may also be apparent in the early stages of other sudden-onset 
symptoms; Stone et al., 2012). Indeed, this may explain why patients with more continuous FNS are 
even less likely to perceive their problem as ฀„฀e฀m฀o฀t฀i฀o฀n฀a฀l฀‟ than patients with PNES (Ludwig, 
Whitehead, Sharpe et al., 2015). This panic-like surge in arousal will also feed into the seizure 
scaffold, influencing how sensory and emotional information is processed during the ictus and 
creating a platform for non-epileptic events that share some of the subjective characteristics of hyper-
arousal, but without the underlying physiological changes. 
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We propose that hyper-arousal also accounts for the evident overlap between many PNES, 
panic attacks and the autonomic symptoms observed in many cases of PTSD. Indeed, we assume that 
the surge in arousal that accompanies reliving phenomena in PTSD is a common trigger for many 
PNES, consistent with the increased prevalence of trauma in this group compared to patients with 
other FNS (Stone et al., 2004; Driver-Dunckley et al., 2011; Reuber et al, 2007). It is also consistent 
with studies showing reduced medial prefrontal and rostral anterior cingulate activity during episodes 
of hyper-arousal and traumatic re-living (Lanius, Vermetten, Loewenstein et al., 2010; Lanius, 
Brand, Vermetten et al., 2012), which are thought to be indicative of reduced inhibitory processing in 
PTSD.  
If the initial source of hyper-arousal is a traumatic flashback, then it is likely that the 
flashback will be a key component of the seizure scaffold (cf. Model 1; see below). In this respect, 
many PNES related to trauma might be thought of as a kind of reliving phenomenon. This is 
reminiscent of psychodynamic ideas concerning the recapitulation of trauma material during PNES 
(e.g., Breuer & Freud, 1893-1895/1955), although the concept of symbolism is not crucial in the 
current account. Importantly, hyper-arousal is not an essential component of PNES in our model, 
clearly distinguishing them from panic attacks and explaining why PNES may occur in the absence 
of a trauma history or obvious acute stressors. Moreover, the seizure scaffold may or may not 
incorporate elements of traumatic memories; even where this is the case, seizures can still be 
triggered in the absence of flashbacks or trauma recollection more generally if there are other sources 
of activation for the scaffold. 
Emotional processing 
 If hyper- and hypo-arousal are common, if not essential, features of PNES, why do patients 
tend to focus on the physical aspects of these changes rather than subjective emotional states such as 
fear? Similarly, if threat processing is a key component of PNES, why is there only a small 
difference between this group and patients with epilepsy in terms of subjective anxiety symptoms? If 
anything, the available evidence suggests that that difference is driven by a sub-group of patients 
with very high self-reported anxiety, and that the wider group of patients with PNES report levels of 
anxiety that are comparable to those reported by healthy controls (Brown & Reuber, 2016). In 
contrast, physical symptom reports are consistently elevated in patients with PNES, even in sub-
groups with relatively few problems in other areas.   
Taken together, these findings seem consistent with the idea that patients with PNES tend to 
represent emotional states as physical symptoms rather than affective experiences (i.e., Model 3). 
One possibility is that this tendency is motivated by the threat-value associated with recognizing the 
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emotional state(s) in question, perhaps because they are inconsistent with the ฀i฀n฀d฀i฀v฀i฀d฀u฀a฀l฀‟฀s self-
concept or because acknowledging the reality of their circumstances feels too dangerous. Although 
originally a psychodynamic idea, a similar concept is also central to cognitive dissonance theory, 
which asserts that conflicting thoughts, feelings, behaviours etc. are associated with tension and 
anxiety, and motivate attempts to alleviate those feelings by reducing the conflict. Focusing attention 
on the physical component of the experience might allow the individual to reduce dissonance, whilst 
meeting an intrinsic need to render the experience predictable, a central concept within predictive 
coding models of functional neurological symptoms (Edwards et al., 2012) and symptom reporting 
more generally (Van den Bergh et al., submitted). In other words, if it is too threatening for the 
individual to recognize the emotional character of their experiences, a physical explanation for them 
is better than the anxiety associated with outright uncertainty (a case of ฀“฀b฀e฀t฀t฀e฀r the devil you ฀k฀n฀o฀w฀”; 
Van den Bergh et al., submitted). Emotional suppression/avoidance may also reduce the precision of 
interoceptive signals, making the individual more reliant on beliefs and expectations about what is 
happening in the body and thereby vulnerable to perceptual distortion (ibid). In some ways, this is a 
modern take on the Freudian concept that converting distress into physical symptoms prevents an 
unhealthy build-up of neural energy. Since the initial threat evaluation is pre-conscious, this shift in 
representation may be entirely outside the ฀i฀n฀d฀i฀v฀i฀d฀u฀a฀l฀‟฀s awareness. The result  of the only study in 
this area to consider preconscious threat evaluation (Bakvis et al., 2009) are consistent with this idea. 
It may also help explain the link between PNES and physical symptom reporting more generally, 
which we predict will be associated with a tendency to represent emotional states in a similar 
manner. For other people, the failure to represent emotional experiences as such may be due to 
intrinsic deficits in the ability to identify and/or describe emotional states or the cognitive 
consequences of high-level processing dysfunction, rather than being defensive in origin. The idea 
that this is only present in some individuals with PNES would explain the inconsistent findings on 
alexithymia in this group (Brown & Reuber, 2016).  
In some circumstances, focusing on the physical aspects of ฀o฀n฀e฀‟฀s experiences may constitute 
a highly adaptive response that enables the individual to retain a relatively normal sense of self and 
well-being in the face of on-going adversity (Dimaro et al., 2014, 2015). Indeed, there is evidence 
that patients who do not experience subjective fear symptoms during their panic attacks are better 
adjusted than those who do (Chen et al., 2009). One potential cost of representing their emotional 
states in this way, however, is that it can prevent them from deploying appropriate compensatory 
responses (e.g., assertion; planful coping; problem solving) to the internal and external stressors 
responsible for their distress. Indeed, several studies have found that patients with PNES are less 
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likely to engage in planful coping than controls (e.g., Frances et al., 1999; Goldstein et al., 2000; 
Testa et al, 2012). This is likely to result in chronic stress and over-arousal, compromising inhibitory 
processing as well as the ฀i฀n฀d฀i฀v฀i฀d฀u฀a฀l฀‟฀s ability to reflect, control action and self-regulate more 
generally. 
Several other findings described above are consistent with the idea that patients with PNES 
are emotionally avoidant, including the evidence of emotional suppression demonstrated by Gul and 
Ahmad (2014), the repression/denial reported by Jawad et al (1995), the emotional avoidance 
identified by Bakvis et al (2011), Dimaro et al  (2014) and Novakova et al (2015) and the avoidant 
coping reported by Frances et al (1999), Goldstein et al (2000), Cronje and Pretorius (2013) and 
Goldstein and Mellers (2006). This concept may also go some way towards explaining the increased 
rate of dissociative experiences in this group, both generally and at the times of the attacks 
themselves. An influential and well-evidenced model by Sierra and Berrios (1998) suggests that 
depersonalization results from a hard-wired threat response involving the top-down inhibition of 
emotional processing in the amygdala. This process is evident in both depersonalization disorder 
(Sierra & David, 2007) and in the dissociative sub-type of PTSD characterized by depersonalization 
symptoms (Lanius et al., 2010, 2012). Although such an interpretation is somewhat removed from 
models derived from ฀J฀a฀n฀e฀t฀‟฀s dissociation theory, it is appealing since it suggests that DES scores will 
often be elevated in patients with PNES, without this being necessary or sufficient to explain the 
phenomenon. It is therefore more consistent with evidence showing that not all patients with PNES 
exhibit high scores on measures such as the DES, and why overall group means tend to be elevated 
but somewhat lower than those seen in other conditions such as PTSD and DID (Brown & Reuber, 
2016).  
PNES and mental fragmentation 
 While this link with depersonalization is seen as indicative of a broader tendency to suppress 
affect, and therefore a predisposing factor for PNES, the concept of dissociative fragmentation (i.e., 
Model 1; aka compartmentalization) is more directly relevant to the automatic activation of rogue 
representations that lies at the heart of the model. Indeed, this idea bears a close resemblance to 
฀J฀a฀n฀e฀t฀‟฀s original suggestion that functional symptoms arise when mental fragments (perceptual 
hypotheses and cognition/action representations in our account) are activated by internal and external 
cues, distorting behaviour and experience accordingly. Importantly, the mechanism underlying 
PNES in this account operates at a relatively late stage in processing, leaving earlier processing intact 
but compartmentalized; this explains, for example, the reversible amnesia observed in the PNES 
patients studied by Kuyk et al (1999). It also suggests that other ictal deficits reported by PNES 
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patients will occur in the context of intact functioning in the affected modalities; thus, patients who 
report loss of consciousness during PNES should show evidence of (largely) intact auditory and 
somatosensory processing during the ictus if an appropriately indirect or implicit measure is used. 
This could be an important test of the model. Our approach departs from Model 1, however, by 
assuming that the mental fragments in question may or may not relate to previous traumatic 
experiences, a notion that is actually more consistent with ฀J฀a฀n฀e฀t฀‟฀s original account than more recent 
dissociation approaches. 
High level processing dysfunction 
A central concept here is that the seizure scaffold will be automatically triggered when its 
activation threshold is exceeded unless the secondary attentional system inhibits it. Anything that 
undermines the secondary attentional system therefore increases the likelihood of PNES (cf. Janet, 
1889). Evidence suggests that depression (e.g., Austin, Mitchell, & Goodwin, 2001), anxiety (e.g., 
Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009), PTSD (e.g., Polak, Witteveen, Reitsma, & Olff, 2012; Lanius et al., 
2010, 2012), early-life adversity (e.g., Pechtel & Pizzagalli, 2011), stress (e.g., Holmes & Wellman, 
2009) and poor sensory gating (e.g., Truelove-Hill & Yadon, 2015) are all associated with deficits in 
executive functioning, which may partly explain their association with PNES. The resulting high 
level processing dysfunction is reminiscent of the ฀“฀u฀n฀s฀t฀a฀b฀l฀e cognitive-emotional ฀s฀y฀s฀t฀e฀m฀” postulated 
by Baslet (2011) as a predisposing factor for the phenomenon, although our emphasis here is 
specifically on high-level inhibitory processes. We propose that a key source of this dysfunction is 
on-going stress and arousal, which may arise from a number of different sources including difficult 
or traumatizing life events (which are often associated with HPA-axis dysregulation; Roelofs & 
Spinhoven, 2007), physical illness, relationship problems, social isolation, emotional conflicts and so 
on. Although there are problems with the literature in this area, the available evidence is largely 
consistent with increased exposure both to traumatic events in childhood and to chronic stress in 
adulthood in patients with PNES (e.g., Brown & Reuber, 2016; Fiszman et al., 2004; Sharpe & Faye, 
2006; Stone et al., 2004; Tojek et al., 2000). We suggest that the inconsistent findings regarding the 
role of stress and trauma reflect the fact that they have an indirect effect on PNES, mediated by their 
effects on arousal levels and high-level inhibitory functioning; in this sense, trauma and serious 
adversity are not necessary for PNES to develop, but may be predisposing factors for some people. 
In others, more subtle stressors, such as chronically unsupportive relationships or those where 
unrealistic demands are placed on the individual, may be much more relevant. 
The extent to which these stressors/threats produce attentional dysfunction will depend on several 
factors, including the nature and duration of the stressors themselves, the use and nature of any 
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coping strategies, the availability of social support and the social environment more generally, and 
the ฀i฀n฀d฀i฀v฀i฀d฀u฀a฀l฀‟฀s intrinsic reactivity to tress/threat. The most deleterious effects are likely to be found 
in situations where the individual is unable to use adaptive coping strategies, such as when they are 
repeatedly exposed to unavoidable adversity (e.g., a traumatic family environment; persecution and 
torture; high levels of traumatic flashbacks), has poor problem-solving and affect regulation skills, 
lacks appropriate social support, and/or is relatively unable to represent emotional states 
symbolically (i.e., alexithymia). In other cases, coping strategies may be either ineffective at 
managing stress (e.g., worry), confer vulnerability to further stressful events (e.g., stigma related to 
self-harm; risk-taking behaviours) and/or directly compromise attentional function (e.g., 
affect/thought suppression; worry/rumination; drug and alcohol misuse; self-poisoning; taking anti-
epileptic drugs, painkillers, sedatives, anti-depressants etc.; Wells, 2000). There is also a reciprocal 
relationship between strategy use and attentional functioning, such that the greater the extent of 
attentional dysfunction, the less the individual will be able to select and execute appropriate coping 
strategies; this increases the likelihood of further attentional dysfunction, setting up a vicious cycle. 
Other factors adversely affecting brain functioning (acquired or congenital brain injury; epilepsy) 
may also impact on attentional ability, which could account for the relationship between PNES, non-
specific brain injury (Reuber, Qurishi, et al., 2003) and epilepsy (Kotsopoulos et al., 2003; Reuber, 
Fernandez, Bauer, Singh, & Elger, 2002).   
There is some neuropsychological and experimental evidence for impaired attentional-executive 
functioning in patients with PNES and symptoms such as memory and concentration problems are 
commonly reported by this group (e.g., Bakvis, Spinhoven, Putman, Zitman, & Roelofs, 2010; 
Pouretemad, Thompson, & Fenwick, 1998; Strutt, Hill, Scott, Uber-Zak, & Fogel, 2011; Willment, 
Hill, Baslet & Loring, 2015). Roelofs, Van Galen, Eling, Keijsers and Hoogduin (2003) also found 
evidence of an attentional deficit in patients with conversion paresis, which would involve similar 
mechanisms to PNES in the current model. Better characterizing this deficit is a task for future 
studies. It is an open question whether such deficits would manifest between seizures or in the pre-
ictal period only; the latter would be of particular interest, although is clearly challenging to test. 
Expectations  
The model presented here suggests that PNES arise when the cognitive system places undue 
weight on the prediction that attacks will occur in certain circumstances. Another way of putting this 
is that PNES are a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy driven by the expectation that attacks are likely to 
occur. Importantly, however, these expectations exert their influence pre-consciously, meaning that 
the individual may or may not be aware of their influence. This concept has much in common with 
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the predictive coding account of FNS described by Edwards et al (2012). We suggest that these 
expectations are acquired incidentally when there is an initial experience (or set of experiences) 
resembling or otherwise suggesting a seizure in the context of cues (e.g., increased muscle tension, 
tremor and other panic-like symptoms resulting from increased anxiety/arousal) and beliefs 
suggesting that this will recur. This fits with evidence described above concerning the learned 
behaviour model of PNES, such as the frequent co-occurrence of PNES and epilepsy, increased 
exposure to seizure models in others, and the disproportionate prevalence of prior head injury with 
loss of consciousness in this group (see Brown & Reuber, 2016, for a review). Such expectations 
may also result from health-related traumatic experiences, which are very common in late-onset 
PNES in particular (Duncan, Oto, Martin, & Pelosi, 2006). Prior physical illness or injury is also 
frequently found in patients with other FNS (Stone et al., 2008), consistent with the common 
mechanism proposed here. 
 Whilst these studies are in keeping with the proposed model, prospective research using 
systematic measures in patients with new-onset PNES are clearly required to estimate the true 
prevalence of the relationship between PNES and antecedent events that create expectations for 
seizure onset. These events are likely to go beyond head injury and panic attacks to encompass a 
wider set of potentially relevant experiences, such as other conditions associated with transient loss 
of consciousness (e.g., syncope), disorientation (e.g., presyncope, hyperventilation), states of 
depersonalization-derealization and any other event that could be mistakenly attributed to a 
seizure/epilepsy. 
The model also predicts that a disproportionate sensitivity to expectancy manipulations, such 
as hypnotic and non-hypnotic suggestion, will be a risk factor for developing PNES and other 
functional symptoms. Evidence of a relationship between PNES and hypnotic suggestibility (e.g., 
Barry et al., 2000; Goldstein et al., 2000; Kuyk et al. 1999) could be seen as consistent with this, as 
could the effectiveness of suggestion-based seizure-induction methods (e.g. McGonigal et al, 2002). 
In both cases the findings are mixed, however, perhaps reflecting ฀p฀a฀r฀t฀i฀c฀i฀p฀a฀n฀t฀s฀‟ fears about losi g 
control and/or other negative beliefs about suggestion/hypnosis. A better test of the hypothesis might 
be to use measures that place less emphasis on participants willfully submitting to suggestions, such 
as the Sensory Suggestibility scale (Gheorghiu & Reyher, 1982). 
Seizure semiology and phenomenology 
More compelling evidence for the model would be provided by experimental studies 
manipulating expectations about the nature of PNES. A key prediction is that the semiology and 
phenomenology of PNES will partly reflect knowledge, beliefs and other mental representations that 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Running head: Towards an integrative theory of PNES 
 
 
27 
 
comprise the seizure scaffold. The studies carried out to date have only compared different PNES 
over a very short period of time and highlighted the stereotypy of different seizures (e.g., Seneviratne 
et al, 2010). One possibility is that benign information could be incorporated into established 
expectancy manipulations (e.g., intravenous saline; photic stimulation) used to provoke attacks in 
some epilepsy units, with a view to studying how this information shapes the nature of subsequent 
symptoms. It should also be possible to study whether the success rate of symptom provocation 
methods is associated with the degree of overlap between specific expectations and the content of the 
seizure scaffold, as assessed on an individual basis. For example, one could predict that photic 
stimulation would only be successful in patients who believe that their attacks are photo-sensitive. 
Again, we are not aware of any existing studies on this topic. A more challenging, but potentially 
more ethical, option would be to study the relationship between naturally occurring events (e.g., 
exposure to epileptic attacks whilst undergoing diagnostic monitoring) and whether this influences 
subsequent PNES during the assessment. Anecdotal reports of the effect of such exposure are 
widespread, but we are not aware of any studies that have addressed this empirically.  
A small number of studies have considered how patients with PNES perceive their illness 
(e.g., Whitehead, Kandler, & Reuber, 2013), although we are not aware of any studies on what these 
patients believe about epilepsy and epileptic attacks, which could illuminate this aspect of the model.  
Attending to seizure cues and triggers 
We assume that the seizure scaffold is elaborated every time the person experiences an attack 
in different circumstances, potentially increasing the number of cues that can trigger attacks over 
time via interoceptive conditioning (for evidence concerning this process in patients with other 
functional symptoms see Van den Bergh, Stegen & Van de Woestijne, et al., 1997; Van den Bergh, 
Winters, Devriese & Van Diest, 2002). Traumatic intrusions and symptoms of hyper- and hypo-
arousal are likely to be particularly important in this regard. An obvious prediction, albeit one that 
has not been subjected to systematic empirical scrutiny, is that symptoms associated with these states 
will be common triggers for PNES. This will include stressful and threatening situations that result in 
hyper-arousal, but should extend beyond this. Indeed, a common clinical anecdote is that patients 
with PNES often deny experiencing attacks when they are stressed, and that they tend to occur when 
the patient finally has the chance to relax. Although this remains to be evaluated empirically, it 
would be consistent with our hypothesis that PNES are just as likely to be triggered by symptoms of 
hypo- as hyper-arousal. 
It should be possible, at least in theory, to relate the development of seizure semiology and 
phenomenology to experiences, events and contexts that the individual encounters over time.  
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Importantly, however, the individual may not be aware of, or able to articulate, the knowledge that 
contributes to the scaffold, much of which is acquired incidentally and stored in forms (e.g., complex 
associations of semantic, perceptual, emotional and procedural information) that are not readily 
accessible to reflection. A priority for future research will therefore be to develop methods for 
assessing individual differences in the seizure scaffold that ฀d฀o฀n฀‟฀t rely exclusively on self-report.  
We hypothesize that the likelihood of an attack occurring in the context of such cues depends 
on the extent to which the individual is looking out for or attending to them. This will partly be a 
function of the pre-existing activation levels of the seizure scaffold, which constitutes the extent to 
which a seizure is ฀“expected฀” to occurii, and partly of threat processing, which triggers 
hypervigilance for, and facilitates engagement with, potential threat cues. A broader deficit in high-
level attention, which we assume is a separate attentional factor to hypervigilance, may also 
contribute to this process by disrupting disengagement from relevant threat cues. Existing research 
on threat bias in PNES (e.g., Bakvis et al., 2009) is insufficient to verify these hypotheses, however, 
which should be a focus for future studies. 
Other factors contributing to PNES development and maintenance  
According to the model, symptom development is largely determined by factors that lead to over-
activation of the seizure program, or which undermine the ฀i฀n฀d฀i฀v฀i฀d฀u฀a฀l฀‟฀s capacity to inhibit it. Any 
such factor has the potential to predispose, precipitate and/or perpetuate PNES, with the precise 
combination of factors varying between individuals. We have already considered some of the factors 
that are relevant in this regard. Unfortunately, the quality and scope of research in this area make it 
difficult to draw firm conclusions regarding other important factors. We will therefore make a 
number of suggestions that are consistent with our model of PNES, but which clearly require 
empirical study.  
Several factors identified in the cognitive behavioural model are likely to be important, 
particularly the tendency to interpret symptoms as seizures/epilepsy and a possible cause for concern. 
We suggest that this results in responses from the self and others that serve to elaborate, consolidate 
and activate the seizure scaffold, such as seeking information about seizures (e.g., on the Internet) 
and pursuing medical assessment and treatment. The scaffold will also be activated every time the 
individual seeks medical help, information or other reassurance in relation to their symptoms, and the 
resulting outcome (e.g., ฀“฀k฀e฀e฀p an eye on ฀i฀t฀”฀; anxiety-provoking and/or misleading information on the 
Internet; inappropriate prescription of anti-epileptic drugs and their side effects) may perpetuate this 
further. Each of these coping strategies may have the additional effect of maintaining hypervigilance, 
plus negative emotional consequences such as stress, anxiety and depression. General avoidance of 
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feared situations (e.g., going out; being alone; bathing; cooking), which has been found in several 
studies on PNES (Cronje & Pretorius, 2013; Frances et al. 1999; Goldstein et al., 2000; Goldstein & 
Mellers, 2006), may allow unhelpful beliefs about the likelihood and dangerousness of seizures (both 
aspects of the scaffold) to proliferate, whilst fostering worry, rumination and social isolation 
(Robson, Drew, Walker & Reuber, 2012). From the psychodynamic/interpersonal perspective, 
unhealthy relationships with oneself and others also provide fertile ground for unhelpful responses to 
PNES, such as toxic appraisals (e.g., ฀“I฀‟฀m pathetic for having this ฀p฀r฀o฀b฀l฀e฀m฀”; ฀“฀S฀h฀e฀‟฀s putting it ฀o฀n฀!฀”฀)฀, 
the use of unhelpful coping strategies (e.g., repeated doctor visits; over-protection from others) and 
conflict with medical staff and carers, undermining social supports and leading to unstable 
therapeutic relationships.  
PNES patient sub-types 
A central assumption of the model described here is that the seizure scaffold is relatively 
fluid and has a stochastic activation threshold that must be exceeded in order for PNES to occur. We 
assume that multiple neuronal systems and pathways contribute to the development, activation and 
maintenance of the scaffold, and thereby the occurrence and features of PNES. We believe this 
approach captures the phenomenology of PNES better than one based on categorical patient sub-
types, whilst allowing for the likelihood that different factors will vary in importance over time 
within individual patients. Nevertheless, the model easily accommodates evidence pointing to the 
existence of distinct sub-groups of PNES patients characterized by relatively high or low levels of 
psychopathology (e.g., Brown et al., 2013; Cragar et al., 2005; Reuber et al., 2004; Uliaszek et al., 
2012). Patients with significant psychopathology exhibit a wide range of risk factors for the 
development of PNES in the current model, including insecure attachment, emotional under-
regulation, maladaptive coping, and increased exposure to stressors (e.g., problematic relationships) 
and potentially traumatizing events. This pattern of difficulties, reminiscent of that seen in borderline 
personality disorder, is likely to be associated with significant high level processing deficits (Ruocco, 
2005) and is therefore in keeping with the approach described here. We also incorporate the idea that 
suppressing, denying or otherwise failing to recognize stress and emotional experiences, coupled 
with a tendency to focus on physical rather than affective states, are likely to contribute to PNES in 
many patients. Such factors are thought to explain why a substantial proportion of patients with 
PNES exhibit relatively low levels of psychopathology but numerous physical symptoms. 
 As we saw previously, it is an open question whether all patients with PNES have difficulties 
regulating their affect in an adaptive manner. One of the advantages of the proposed model is that it 
links PNES to normal psychological processes (learning, attention, automatic behavioural control), 
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which go awry for various reasons. This leaves open the possibility that symptoms could arise in the 
absence of significant psychopathology, affective dysregulation or emotional suppression. Indeed, 
the approach on which this model is based assumes that the same basic mechanisms are involved in 
both pathological (e.g., PNES and other MUS) and non-pathological compartmentalization 
phenomena (e.g., temporary symptoms produced by hypnotic suggestion; Brown, 2002b, 2013b; 
Janet, 1889; Oakley, 1999). It also suggests that there are more basic predisposing factors for these 
phenomena, such as heightened suggestibility, the tendency to become absorbed in experiences 
(Bell, Oakley, Halligan, & Deeley, 2011; Brown & Oakley, 2004) and poor interoceptive accuracy 
(Bogaerts, Van Eylen, Li, et al, 2010; Schaefer et al, 2012). Theoretically, such factors could, if 
coupled with a context that affords the development and activation of seizure programs, be sufficient 
to give rise to PNES without any contribution from trauma, stress or psychopathology. Exploring this 
possibility is an intriguing question for future research.   
TREATMENT IMPLICATIONS 
Although the model outlined above is primarily described in cognitive terms, and is 
compatible with a cognitive behavioural approach, it does not suggest that cognitive interventions are 
the only (or necessarily the most appropriate) way of addressing the various predisposing, 
precipitating and perpetuating factors that contribute to PNES. Indeed, emotional inhibition and the 
tendency to represent affective states as physical experiences, which we identify as important 
vulnerability factors for PNES, are key psychodynamic concepts that may be best tackled using 
interventions from that tradition. For example, creating a safe therapeutic environment that enables 
the individual to recognize, tolerate and accept the broader emotional dimension to their physical 
symptoms may be particularly important for these individuals (e.g., Howlett & Reuber, 2009). 
Psychodynamic and interpersonal methods may also be useful in cases where unhelpful, but 
potentially unacknowledged, patterns of relating are driving stress/arousal (or vice versa) and thereby 
PNES. In many cases, however, there is also likely to be a need for more directive interventions that 
enable patients to develop strategies (e.g., relaxation, grounding, distraction) for managing hyper- 
and hypo-arousal and traumatic material.   
Alongside tackling emotional regulation and representation where appropriate, the focus of 
treatment according to our model is on identifying and addressing factors that are activating the 
seizure scaffold and compromising attentional functioning. This includes tackling the circumstances 
that give rise to negative affect, chronic stress and heightened threat processing; dismantling aspects 
of the seizure scaffold more generally (e.g., beliefs concerning the meaning of attacks) and replacing 
them with healthier mental representations; and enhancing top-down control of the seizure scaffold, 
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perhaps using attention training or neurorehabilitation techniques. Simply explaining the diagnosis to 
patients may be sufficient to reduce arousal, alter coping and re-structure the scaffold (Duncan, 
Razvi, & Mulhern, 2011; Mayor et al., 2012). Whilst many of the interventions used to address these 
factors are likely to already be in use with PNES patients, the proposed model offers a framework for 
making systematic decisions about which interventions are most likely to help someone with PNES, 
without declaring allegiance to any particular ฀“฀s฀c฀h฀o฀o฀l฀” or “model฀” of therapy. In addition, the model 
suggests a number of avenues for clinical development, including the use of mindfulness, hypnotic 
suggestion and imagery techniques (see e.g., Brown, 2013a). 
CONCLUSION 
The label PNES is a neurological diagnosis of convenience, in most cases meant to denote 
that a ฀p฀a฀t฀i฀e฀n฀t฀‟฀s seizures are not related to epileptic discharges in the brain but are instead considered 
to have a ฀“฀p฀s฀y฀c฀h฀o฀l฀o฀g฀i฀c฀a฀l฀” cause. The patients to whom this diagnostic label is given make up a 
highly heterogeneous group in terms of background, personality profiles, comorbidities, response to 
treatment and outcomes. Most previous accounts of the nature of PNES have dealt with this 
heterogeneity by describing a broad range of predisposing, precipitating and perpetuating factors 
without identifying necessary and sufficient features that explain the pathogenesis of the disorder.  
In keeping with our previous Integrative Cognitive Model (ICM) of other medically 
unexplained symptoms we suggest that the preconscious activation of a rogue mental representation, 
the seizure scaffold, by internal or external triggers is common to all PNES (with the exception of 
those that result from ฀p฀a฀t฀i฀e฀n฀t฀s฀‟ w ll d action, for instance in the context of factitious disorder). These 
rogue representations consist of cognitive-emotional-behavioural action programs that combine 
elements of inherent schemata (such as how to respond to fear) with the results of learning and 
experience across multiple contexts. Activation of the scaffold may or may not be associated with 
abnormal arousal, emotion or cognitive processing, accounting for the wide range of different PNES 
manifestations.   
This model is in keeping with the findings of original studies documenting increased levels of 
previous trauma, heightened anxiety, arousal and avoidance in some but not all patients with PNES. 
It allows for PNES occurring in states of hypo- and hyper-arousal, as well as from a normal resting 
state. We believe the theory described here represents a major advance in our understanding of 
PNES, enabling existing theories and empirical findings to be integrated within a single overarching 
framework, thereby accounting for a number of hitherto unexplained aspects of PNES. 
Whilst our model uses the language of cognitive psychology, we do not wish to suggest that 
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helpful for individual cases but other psychotherapeutic treatment options may be more appropriate 
to address relevant targets, such as increasing patients฀‟ tolerance of traumatic memories, other 
seizure triggers and arousal, helping them regulate their emotions more effectively, or changing 
interpersonal patterns of behaviour likely to foster recurrence or hinder recovery. 
Aside from explaining existing findings in this area, a key strength of our account is that it 
makes a number of testable predictions, for instance that primary sensory processing should be 
normal during PNES, that PNES do not invariably occur in a state of autonomic arousal, that PNES 
manifestations and experience are likely to change over a pa฀t฀i฀e฀n฀t฀s฀‟ lifetime, and that PNES 
manifestations can be affected by patient expectations. These hypotheses will need to be tested in 
future studies involving sufficiently large groups of patients with PNES to capture the heterogeneity 
of this disorder. 
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FIGURE LEGENDS  
FIGURE 1: Hypothesized sequence of events in PNES. Essential components of the process are 
represented in the dashed area. Although hyper- and hypo-arousal (arousal levels not appropriate to the 
฀p฀a฀t฀i฀e฀n฀t฀‟฀s curr nt environment and internal state) are frequently present in PNES, and may give rise to 
high-level processing dysfunction, abnormal arousal is not an essential aspect of the PNES generation 
process. For example, strong activation of the seizure scaffold in the presence of an inhibitory processing 
dysfunction may be sufficient to trigger an attack even in the absence of heightened arousal. The figure 
focuses on how rather than why PNES arise. Recognised risk factors for PNES such as a history of 
traumatisation, emotional dysregulation, alexithymia, psychopathology and heightened suggestibility will 
confer vulnerability to the processes depicted, but are neither necessary nor sufficient in this account.  
  
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Running head: Towards an integrative theory of PNES 
 
 
45 
 
 
  
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Running head: Towards an integrative theory of PNES 
 
 
46 
 
HIGHLIGHTS 
x Current models of PNES can account for some but not all of the available data  
x Automatic activation of seizure representations in memory may be a unifying process 
x Suppression of arousal and distress are typical maintaining factors for PNES  
x Inhibitory dysfunction, often arising from chronic stress, is a key vulnerability  
x Trauma exposure is common but neither necessary nor sufficient for PNES to occur 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                 
iThe term ฀“฀p฀h฀y฀s฀i฀c฀a฀l฀” is u ed here to denote demonstrable medical pathology, such as that 
associated with brain injury or disease. It should not be taken as implying that PNES do not 
have a physical substrate in the brain or, conversely, that ฀“฀p฀s฀y฀c฀h฀o฀l฀o฀g฀i฀c฀a฀l฀” fact rs are not 
relevant for understanding epilepsy. Our emphasis on the psychological aspects of PNES 
reflects the widely held view that this level of explanation is currently the most helpful for 
understanding these conditions. We are not suggesting that physical factors are irrelevant or 
that PNES will not eventually be described in physiological terms. Indeed, some ฀“฀p฀h฀y฀s฀i฀c฀a฀l฀” 
problems such as a previous diagnosis of epilepsy or a history of head injury are well 
recognised as risk factors for developing PNES; these are incorporated into our account 
below. 
ii
 In other words, predicted by the cognitive system; this is not necessarily conscious. 
 
